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IMMEDIATE APPEAL OF PRETRIAL COMMITMENT
ORDERS: "IT'S NOW OR NEVER"
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the mentally deficient and the criminal law is
the subject of much debate and commentary.I Criminal justice systems
incorporate a variety of safeguards to ensure fair treatment of the men-
tally deficient.2 Congress' recognition of the special needs of mentally
deficient criminal defendants culminated in the passage of the original
version of the Insanity Defense Reform Act (the "Act").3 The Act, in its
original and amended versions, delineates procedures to determine a
criminal defendant's competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time
of the offense. It also governs the confinement of the mentally deficient
defendant.4
1. See S. Guze, Criminality and Psychiatric Disorders 13 (1976). This interest
stems from the "desire to understand the nature of criminality, and the need to define the
limits of criminal responsibility." Id.; see Goddard, General Introduction to E. Hoag &
E. Williams, Crime, Abnormal Minds, and the Law at xii (1923). Numerous books have
been written in an attempt to clarify the legal position of the mentally deficient criminal
defendant. See, e.g., H. Fingarette & A Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal Respon-
sibility (1979); E. Hoag & E. Williams, Crime, Abnormal Minds, and the Law (1923); H.
Huckabee, Lawyers, Psychiatrists and Criminal Law: Cooperation or Chaos? (1980); R.
Lasky, Evaluation of Criminal Responsibility in Multiple Personality and the Related
Dissociative Disorders (1982); A. Matthews, Jr., Mental Disability and the Criminal
Law: A Field Study (1970); A. Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition
(1975) [hereinafter Mental Health]; W. White, Insanity and the Criminal Law (1923).
Significant essay collections on the subject include: By Reason of Insanity (L. Freedman
ed. 1983); Crime and Insanity (R. Nice ed. 1958); Mentally Disordered Offenders (J.
Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983); 2 The Psychological Foundations of Criminal Jus-
tice (H. Vetter & R. Rieber eds. 1980). See generally E. Cook, The Insane or Mentally
Impaired Defendant-A Selected Bibliography from the Professional Literature (1983)
(reference to law and psychiatry journals, reviews and books); W. Pointer, The Handi-
capped Offender, A Selected Bibliography (1981) (reference published by the United
States Department of Justice); D. Tompkins, Insanity and the Criminal Law: A Bibliog-
raphy (1960) (reference published by the Bureau of Public Administration).
In recent years, debate over the rights of the mentally deficient criminal defendant has
reached unprecedented heights in reaction to the acquittal of John Hinckley, Jr. in 1982
under the insanity defense. See American Psychiatric Ass'n., Issues in Forensic Psychia-
try 3, 7 (1984); Commission on the Mentally Disabled, ABA, Mental Disbility Law: A
Primer 21-22 (1985) [hereinafter Commission Primer]. For a full discussion of the Hinck-
ley trial and public reaction to it see A. Stone, Law, Psychiatry, and Morality 77-98
(1984).
2. The safeguards include the availability of competency proceedings and the de-
fense of insanity. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (Supp. III 1985); Favole, Mental Disability
in the American Criminal Process A Four Issue Survey, in Mentally Disordered Offenders
247-69 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983) (survey of state statutes providing proce-
dures for competency determinations and invocation of the insanity defense). This Note
focuses only on competency proceedings under the federal statutes.
3. Act of Sept. 7, 1949, Pub. L. No. 285, 63 Stat. 686 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (Supp. IIl 1985)). For a discussion of the purposes of the Act see
infra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
4. See Act of Sept. 7, 1949, Pub. L. No. 285, 63 Stat. 686 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (Supp. III 1985)).
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The incompetency plea has received scant scholarly attention in com-
parison to the insanity defense.' Although the insanity defense is raised
affirmatively during the trial,6 incompetency may be raised at any time
between commencement of prosecution7 and sentencing, including dur-
ing the trial.8 Incompetency determinations suspend all criminal pro-
ceedings until the defendant attains competency.9 Any significant doubt
5. See N. Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law 37 (1982); Schulman, Determina-
tion of Competency-Burial at the Crossroad, in 2 The Psychological Foundations of
Criminal Justice 149 (H. Vetter & R. Rieber eds. 1980); Steadman & Hartstone, Defend-
ants Incompetent to Stand Trial, in Mentally Disordered Offenders 39 (J. Monahan & H.
Steadman eds. 1983).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 4242 (Supp. III 1985); ABA Standing Committee on Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, at 7-139 (First
Tent. Draft 1983) [hereinafter ABA Standards]; Commission Primer supra note 1, at 21.
7. The legislative history of the 1984 amendments to the Act explain that a motion
for a competency determination may be made after either the date of the actual arrest or
the filing of an information or the return of an indictment, whichever commences the
prosecution. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3416.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (Supp. III 1985); see also A. Matthews, supra note 1, at
72-73 (illustration that issue of defendant's competency may be raised at any time be-
tween arrest and sentencing); Mental Health, supra note 1 at 200-01 (charting various
times when inquiry of defendant's competency may intervene in judicial process). For
further discussion of the differences between the insanity defense and competency deter-
minations, see infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
Despite their differences, insanity and incompetency usually are confused. See Mental
Health, supra note 1, at 202 ("Unfortunately few psychiatrists understand the distinction
between competency and criminal responsibility."); ABA Standards, supra note 6, at 7-
139 ("Perhaps the criminal mental health concepts most frequently misunderstood by the
lay public, . . . attorneys, judges and mental health professionals, are ... insanity at the
time of the offense ... and [incompetency] to stand trial."); see also D. Whitcomb & R.
Brandt, Competency to Stand Trial (1985) (policy brief issued by National Institute of
Justice, a division of the United States Department of Justice, in response to pervasive
confusion between insanity defense and incompetency to stand trial).
The confusion between the two concepts flows logically from what has been termed as
the "troubled relationship between the vagaries of psychiatric evaluation and the difficul-
ties of judicial determinations of incompetence." Suggs v. LaVallee, 570 F.2d 1092, 1119
(2d Cir.) (Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978). See Winick, Re-
structuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 921, 922 (1985) (Competency
status is the legal concept "most frequently misunderstood by attorneys, judges, and
mental health professionals, as well as by the public."). "[B]ecause of the imprecision of
the norms in this area, much is lost in the translation from psychiatrist to judge or jury,
between diagnosis and decision." Suggs v. LaVallee, 570 F.2d 1092, 1190 (2d Cir.)
(Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978).
9. See United States v. Sullivan, 406 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1969); Youtsey v, United
States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899); Winick, supra note 8, at 924. Due processs re-
quires the suspension of criminal proceedings against an incompetent defendant. See
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) (suspension of criminal proceedings is
"fundamental to an adversary system of justice"); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966); Acosta v. Turner, 666 F.2d 949, 953 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Fitch v. Estelle, 587
F.2d 773, 777 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); United States v. Masthers, 539
F.2d 721, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Phillips v. Lane, 580 F. Supp. 839,
842-43 (N.D. II1. 1984), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 249 (1986); see also Holmes v. King, 709
F.2d 965, 966-67 (5th Cir.) (state must provide adequate procedures to protect substan-
tive due process right not to be tried for crime while incompetent), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
984 (1983).
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as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation,t
10. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (where evidence raises bona fide
doubt as to defendant's competency, hearing must be held); United States v. Clark, 617
F.2d 180, 185 (9th Cir. 1980) (where evidence raises reasonable doubt as to defendant's
competency, a hearing must be held); Schulman, supra note 5, at 153 ("if any doubt at all
is presented by either the defense or the prosecution, the court must then make some
determination of the defendant's competency to stand trial"); Bennett, A Guided Tour
Through Selected ABA Standards Relating to Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 375, 387 (1985) ("[J]udge not only has the right, but the duty to raise and resolve
issue of potential incompetence whenever there is a good faith doubt about the defend-
ant's competence, even over the defendant's objection."); Winick, supra note 8, at 925
("[A] prudent trial judge, wishing to avoid possible reversal, will order a formal compe-
tency evaluation in virtually every case in which doubt about competency is raised.");
e-g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 457 n.1 (1981) (trial judge explained that he orders
competency proceedings in all cases where defendant may receive death penalty and his
competency is doubtful).
The competency determination is made on the facts of the case, with a view to whether
the defendant is able to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense. See Dusky
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (setting out common law test of
incompetency as whether the defendant is able to consult with his lawyer and whether he
has factual understanding of proceedings against him); 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (Supp. III
1985) (court must determine whether defendant "is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense"). In
Wieter v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1961), the court listed eight elements the
defendant must possess to be considered competent to stand trial:
(1) that he has mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time,
place and things; (2) that his elementary mental processes are such that he ap-
prehends (i.e. seizes and grasps with what mind he has) that he is in a Court of
Justice, charged with a criminal offense; (3) that there is a Judge on the Bench;
(4) a Prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge; (5)
that he has a lawyer... who will undertake to defend him against that charge;
(6) that he will be expected to tell his lawyer the circumstances, to the best of
his mental ability,... the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the
law violation is alleged to have been committed; (7) that there is, or will be, a
jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to his guilt or innocence of such
charge; and (8) he has memory sufficient to relate those things in his own per-
sonal manner ....
Id. at 321-22; see Bennett, supra at 379-80. The presence of these elements is determined
by evaluating such things as the defendant's medical history and demeanor, psychiatric
reports and defense counsel's opinion of defendant's competency. See Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975); United States ex reL Rivers v. Franzen, 692 F.2d 491, 498 (7th
Cir. 1982); Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981); United States
v. Clark, 617 F.2d 180, 185-86 (9th Cir. 1980); Reese v. Wainwright, 600 F.2d 1085, 1092
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979); United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 360
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
The mere presence of certain impairments, without more, does not result in incompe-
tency per se. See eg., Barfield v. Woodard, 748 F.2d 844, 850-52 (4th Cir. 1984) (drug
use); United States v. Metcalfe, 698 F.2d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 910 (1983); United States v. Mota, 598 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1979) (amnesia), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1084 (1980); United States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir.)
(same), cert denied, 439 U.S. 849 (1978); Reed v. United States, 529 F.2d 1239, 1240.41
(5th Cir.) (drug use), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 887 (1976); United States v. Williams, 468
F.2d 819, 820 (5th Cir. 1972) (same). Even displays of a defendant's mental illness will
not render automatic a determination of incompetency. See e.g., Wolf v. United States,
430 F.2d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1970); Wheeler v. United States, 404 F.2d 252, 254 (8th Cir.
1968); Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 236 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872
(1962).
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The number of defendants hospitalized as incompetent" and the ulti-
mate length of their commitments1 2 is startling.
In light of the hardships borne by the defendant and the criminal jus-
tice system upon a finding of incompetency,' 3 the need to provide a
mechanism for weeding out erroneous determinations is clear. "
Although the statutory framework provides for periodic reevaluation of
the initial finding of incompetency,' 5 it is an inadequate mechanism to
11. See ABA Standards, supra note 6, at 7-140 (citing survey revealing that "52% of
all offenders in mental institutions are there because of incompetence to stand trial");
Bacon, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Commitment to an Inclusive Test 42 S. Cal. L. Rev.
444, 444 (1969) ("[O]ne out of fifty felony defendants is declared incompetent to stand
trial; and for each defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, one hundred persons
accused are adjudged incompetent.") (footnote omitted); Schulman, supra note 5, at 148
("[I]t is speculated that across the nation at any given time, there are about 15,000 per-
sons hospitalized who are [adjudicated incompetent to stand trial on charges brought
against them]."); Steadman & Hartstone, supra note 5, at 39 (incompetent criminal de-
fendants "comprise[ ] about 32% of the admissions of mentally disordered offenders");
see also Steadman & Hartstone, supra note 5, at 40-42 (evaluation of results of 1978
national mail survey sent to mental facilities nationwide revealing that on any given day
in the United States in 1978 there were 3400 confined defendants adjudicated as incompe-
tent to stand trial).
12. See Winick, supra note 5, at 934 ("One recent study found that incompetent de-
fendants were hospitalized for an average period of two to three years, and that many
were held for considerably longer periods."); Steadman & Hartstone, supra note 5, at 48
(detention of incompetents ranges from one year to approximately three and one half
years, depending on the severity of the pending charges). The case of United States ex rel.
von Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) provides a most egregious
example of the length of confinement of an incompetent defendant. In von Wolfersdorf,
the court held that the defendant's ultimate confinement as incompetent to stand trial for
twenty years was a violation of due process. Id. at 68; see United States ex reL Daniels v.
Johnston, 328 F. Supp. 100, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (confining defendant for over eight
years solely on the basis of incompetency to stand trial violates due process).
13. The defendant's hardships include lengthy confinement to often poorly run maxi-
mum security institutions, subjection to psychotropic drug treatment, frustration of bail
and impairment to defense. See Winick, supra note 8, at 938-49; 2 The Psychological
Foundations of Criminal Justice 137 (H. Vetter & R. Rieber eds. 1980); see also Note,
The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Separating Those Unfit for Adversary Com-
bat from Those Who Are Fit, 66 Ky. L.J. 666, 679-80 (1978) (erroneous incompetency
determinations work to disadvantage of defendant by weakening his defense and possibly
inducing mental disorder); cf Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972) (pretrial
detention often results in defendant losing his job, his family life being disrupted and
impairment of his ability to prepare defense, gather evidence and contact witnesses). The
hardships on the criminal justice system largely are the great expenses incurred for psy-
chiatrists, institutionalization and treatment. See Winick, supra note 8, at 932-38. The
delay in the trial caused by the commitment may also impair the prosecution's case. See
infra note 43 and accompanying text.
14. The confusion among lawyers and psychiatrists about the criteria for competency,
see supra note 8, has led to unnecessary and unwarranted commitment to mental hospi-
tals. See Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Competency to
Stand Trial and Mental Illness 122-23 (1973).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e) (Supp. III 1985). When the director of the facility to
which a defendant is committed believes that defendant has attained competency, he files
with the court a certificate so stating and the court then holds a hearing to determine
whether defendant indeed is competent. See id. Semiannual progress reports must be
filed with the court by the director of the facility to which defendant is committed. See
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protect the criminal justice system and the defendant from the cost and
delay of the initial erroneous institutionalization of a competent
defendant.16
This Note suggests that immediate appeal of pretrial commitment or-
ders minimizes these hardships. Immediate review of incompetency de-
terminations by an appellate court helps to avoid the unfairness and
inefficiencies of unnecessary institutionalization. Part I of this Note dis-
cusses the collateral order doctrine and its application in criminal cases.
Part II examines the different judicial approaches to appealability of pre-
trial commitment orders. Part III demonstrates that judicial precedent,
the policies underlying the finality requirement of appellate jurisdiction
and the purposes of the Insanity Defense Reform Act all support treating
pretrial commitment orders as collateral and immediately appealable.
I. THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES.
A. The Collateral Order Doctrine
Pursuant to section 1291 of the Judicial Code,1 7 appellate courts may
review only final district court orders. The rule of finality, in both civil
and criminal cases, is premised on maintaining efficient administration of
justice.18 To avoid an unduly narrow construction of finality, 9 the col-
lateral order doctrine recognizes that certain matters not technically final
are sufficiently final, as a practical matter, to warrant immediate ap-
peal. 21 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,2 the Supreme
ia at § 4247(e)(1)(A). Even when the director has not filed a certificate, defendant's
counsel or legal guardian may move for a hearing 180 days after the most recent court
finding of incompetency. See id at § 4247(h) (Supp. III 1985).
16. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
17. The statute provides in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals . . .shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States
... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1982); see 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice C 110.06 (2d ed.
1985) [hereinafter Moore's Federal Practice].
18. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940); Kenyatta v. Moore,
744 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985); Moore's Federal
Practice, supra note 17, 110.07, at 107; see also infra notes 149-61 and accompanying
text (discussing policy underlying finality).
19. "Due regard for efficiency in litigation must not be carried so far as to deny all
opportunity for the appeal contemplated by the statutes." Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323, 329 (1940); see DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1962) (final-
ity "need not invite self-defeating judicial construction" that would "frustrate the right to
appellate review"); cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.l 1 (1976) ("[S]tatutorily
created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial
collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.").
20. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); David v.
Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 416-17 (9th Cir. 1977); West v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 558 F.2d 977, 981 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 528 F.2d 5,
10 (2d Cir. 1975).
21. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
1987]
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Court set forth three requirements for appealability under the collateral
order doctrine: conclusiveness, collateralness and unreviewability.22
Conclusiveness2" under the collateral order doctrine means that there
must be a conclusive determination of the matter from which the appeal
is taken.24 The decision cannot be one that is "tentative, informal or
incomplete."25 An order is conclusive when no further steps can be
taken in the district court to avoid its effects.26
An order is collateral if it does not "make any step toward final dispo-
sition of the merits"27 and will not "merge" in the final judgment.2" A
collateral order resolves an important issue29 so separable from the mer-
22. See id. at 546. The Court recently has reaffirmed the collateral order doctrine
requirements. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985) (quoting
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
23. Courts sometimes refer to this requirement as "finality." See, e.g., Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) (referring to trial court's "final rejection of a...
claim"); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (finding a "final
disposition of a claimed right"). The term "finality," however, also is used to describe an
order that satisfies the three requisites of the collateral order doctrine and therefore is
appealable under § 1291. See, e.g., Abney, 431 U.S. at 662 (pretrial order satisfying col-
lateral order doctrine constituted a "final decision"); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (district
court's decision was final before appeal taken). Thus, to avoid this confusion, this Note
uses the term "conclusiveness" to represent finality as one of the requisites of the collat-
eral order doctrine and the term finality as the satisfaction of all three requisites of the
collateral order doctrine. Cf Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)
(one element necessary to satisfy the collateral order doctrine is conclusive determination
of the disputed question).
24. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) ("must conclusively
determine the disputed question"); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977)
("threshold requirement [is a] fully consumated decision").
25. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
26. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985); Abney v. United States, 431
U.S. 651, 659 (1977); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
27. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
28. See id.
29. The requirement of an important issue sometimes is said to be an independent
element of the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v.
Duncan, 714 F.2d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984); In re
Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980); Socialist Workers Party v. Grubisic,
604 F.2d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 1979). Post-trial reviewability, however, usually reflects
the importance of the issue in that the courts define an important interest as one that
should not be denied review. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 670 F.2d 1316,
1318 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) ("In determining whether an order is effectively unreviewable on
appeal, we must 'ascertain whether an important right will be lost, probably irreparably,
if review must await a final judgment.'" (quoting United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113,
124-25 (3d Cir. 1981))); In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (re-
gardless of importance of issue, "no interlocutory appeal would lie from the denial of a
[disqualification] motion in the absence of showing that irreparable harm might otherwise
result"); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 439-40 (2d Cir. 1980) (importance of
ethical questions raised by disqualification motions did not require immediate appeal
since interest can be vindicated adequately post-trial) appeal vacated, 449 U.S. 1106
(1981); see also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mulligan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Having found no post-Cohen Supreme
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its3" that even if erroneous, the order is not grounds for disturbing the
final judgment." When trial proceedings are necessary to determine the
validity of the order, separability usually is lacking.32 Because of concern
with avoiding unnecessary delay, it is more likely that an order will be
deemed collateral when immediate appeal would not directly cause the
postponement of the trial.33
Courts place primary emphasis on the unreviewability requirement of
the collateral order doctrine. 4 Unless the order is unreviewable on ap-
peal from the verdict, the interest in consolidating all objections in one
post-trial appeal outweighs the appellant's interest in immediate re-
view.35 When effective post-trial review is possible, courts do not tolerate
Court authority which has turned upon this 'public importance' factor or indeed has even
mentioned it, I am now compelled to conclude that it is not a Cohen requirement.").
In any event, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently has recognized the
importance of the liberty interest frustrated by the pretrial commitment order. See
United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1986). For the purposes of this
Note, therefore, the element of importance is incorporated into the requirement of un-
reviewability. See infra notes 34-41, 126-47 and accompanying text.
30. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977) ("elements of [the] claim are
completely independent of [defendant's] guilt or innocence"); DiBella v. United States,
369 U.S. 121, 127 (1962) (claim cannot involve "an issue that is involved in and will be
part of a criminal prosecution in process"); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombi-
ana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 689 (1950) (claim is "fairly severable from the context of a
larger litigious process"); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949) (order "will not be merged in final judgment").
31. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) ("the mat-
ters embraced in the decision appealed from are not of such an interlocutory nature as to
affect, or to be affected by, decision of the merits of this case"); Note, Appealability in the
Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 365 (1961) [hereinafter Appealability].
32. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) (order disqualifying at-
torney not collateral because "[ilts validity cannot be adequately reviewed until trial is
complete"); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 859 (1978) (order denying mo-
tion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds not collateral because its validity depends on
prejudice at trial).
33. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("order fixing
bail can be reviewed without halting the main trial-its issues are entirely independent of
the issues to be tried"); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 326 (1940) (no imme-
diate appeal where the result would be "'to halt in the orderly progress of a cause and
consider incidentally a question which has happened to cross the path of such litigation
... '" (quoting Segurola v. United States 275 U.S. 106, 112 (1927))); see, eg., Richardson-
Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434 (1985) (appeal of disqualification order in civil
cases has practical effect of delaying proceedings until appeal is decided; order not imme-
diately appealable); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 269-70 (1984) (appeal of
disqualification order in criminal case necessarily delays trial so not immediately
appealable).
34. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985); United States v. Hollywood
Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1982); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850,
855-56 (1978); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 725 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S.
829 (1984); see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940) ("[Finality
is] departed from only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any
review at all.").
35. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940); David v. Hooker,
Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 416-17 (9th Cir. 1977); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 541
F.2d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 1976); cf United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 859 (1978)
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the burdens of delay and piecemeal appellate litigation.36
The reviewability of an order is a function of its remediability. 3' An
order is effectively unreviewable when it results in an irreparable denial
of rights that the appellate court is ill-equipped to vindicate after trial.3"
When deferred review irretrievably exposes a party to the harm from
which a right arguably shields him, immediate appeal is necessary to pre-
serve the right.39 Thus, a desire only to avoid the effects during the trial
of certain pretrial orders is insufficient to warrant their immediate ap-
peal.' When the order is not unreviewable, the appellate court may, at a
minimum, order a new trial.4 ' An order concerning a right that is frus-
trated by postponing its vindication, however, necessitates immediate
appeal.
B. Application of the Collateral Order Doctrine in Criminal Cases
The collateral order doctrine appears less frequently in criminal cases
(speedy trial claim was not immediately appealable because the "claim would be largely
satisfied by an acquittal").
36. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981) (order
refusing to disqualify counsel not immediately appealable because reviewable post-trial);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (order denying class certifica-
tion not immediately appealable because subject to effective post-trial review).
37. Reviewability is determined not by the existence of jurisdiction over an appeal,
but by the opportunity afforded by the appeal to prosecute one's claims. See Robbins v.
Maggio, 750 F.2d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 1985); cf.Appealability, supra note 31, at 364 (collat-
eral order doctrine is premised on finding irreparable harm, that is, probable, severe and
unreviewable injury).
38. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339
U.S. 684, 688-89 (1950); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949); see also United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978) (Supreme Court
cases in which unreviewability existed "each involved an asserted right the legal and
practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial").
39. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1979) (denial of motion to dismiss
on speech and debate clause grounds was immediately appealable collateral order because
deferred review would expose the defendant to trial, contrary to the clause's implied pro-
tection from trial proceedings); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1977) (de-
nial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was immediately appealable
because deferred review would expose the defendant to a second trial, contrary to his
right to protection from exposure to a second trial).
40. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 268 (1982); Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981); United States v. MacDon-
ald, 435 U.S. 850, 860-61 (1978); Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1087 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 948 (1984).
41. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 268 (1982)
("[P]rovision of a new trial free of prejudicial error normally [is an] adequate means of
vindicating the constitutional rights of the accused."); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 (1981) ("[S]hould the Court of Appeals conclude after the trial
has ended that [denying the disqualification order] was prejudicial error, it would retain
its usual authority to vacate the judgment appealed from and order a new trial.")
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than in civil cases.42 The criminal law recognizes a strong prosecutorial
interest in avoiding delay,43 precluding review of most pretrial orders.
On the other hand, the criminal law also places a high premium on
preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing the anxiety and
concern of the defendant and limiting any impairment to the defense,'
all militating in favor of immediate review of pretrial orders that frus-
trate these concerns. The need to avoid delay, joined with society's inter-
est in the prompt resolution of crimes and punishment of criminals,4 5
however, usually outweigh the criminal defendant's interest in immediate
review of pretrial orders.4 6
The Supreme Court has sanctioned immediate appeal of three types of
pretrial orders in criminal cases: denial of a motion to reduce bail,47 de-
nial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds48 and denial of a
motion to dismiss on speech and debate clause grounds.49 In each case,
the asserted right could be vindicated only by immediate appeal.5" The
42. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1984); DiBella v. United
States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962).
43. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962). As time passes, the prose-
cution's ability to meet its burden of proof may diminish greatly; evidence and witnesses
may disappear, and testimony becomes more easily impeachable as the events in issue
become more remote. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984); United
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54, 862 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651, 657 (1977).
44. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858 (1978) (quoting Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)); see also Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264
(1984) ("As the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial indicates, the accused
may have a strong interest in speedy resolution of the charges against him."); Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the
unhampered preparation of a defense"); Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 384-85 (6th Cir.
1982) (possibility of impairment to the defense is limited by speedy trial clause); United
States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D.P.R. 1984) (ability to prepare defense
is protected by Bail Reform Act, which affords defendant a reasonable opportunity to
consult with counsel and prepare his defense), aff'd, 755 F.2d 203 (1985).
45. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264-65 (1984); United States v. Mac-
Donald, 435 U.S. 850, 862 (1978).
46. It is only when the order is unreviewable in post-conviction appeal that the de-
fendant's interest in immediate review is sufficient to justify immediate appeal. See supra
notes 34-41 and accompanying text and infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
Although in certain cases the more efficient route is to allow the appellate court to reach
the merits despite a lack of finality of the pretrial order, this temptation is resisted out of
deference to the finality requirement and its underlying purposes. See 15 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3905, at 422-24 (1976); infra notes
148-61 and accompanying text. Substantial waste is caused by continuing the trial past
an order the reversal of which would have ended the proceedings. This practice, how-
ever, is ultimately far less wasteful than the immediate appeal of all pretrial orders. See
C. Wright, supra, § 3907, at 429.
47. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951).
48. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977).
49. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 (1979).
50. See id. at 508 (to enjoy full protection of speech and debate clause, which protects
congressmen from consequences of a lawsuit as well as burdens of defending themselves,
immediate appeal is necessary); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (imme-
diate appeal is necessary to protect accused's rights under double jeopardy clause that
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federal courts of appeals have taken immediate appeals from other types
of pretrial orders. 5' A common thread running through these decisions
is a strong emphasis on the unreviewability requirement of the collateral
order doctrine. 2
Post-conviction review of the denial of a competency hearing or of a
finding of competency can effectively redress the wrong inherent in try-
ing an incompetent defendant. The appellate court can eliminate the ef-
fects of the tainted trial by ordering a retrial with the opportunity to
determine anew the defendant's present competency.5 3 Post-conviction
review of a finding of pretrial incompetency that results in confinement
to a mental hospital, however, is ineffective.54 No appellate remedy can
recompense the defendant for time unnecessarily spent in a mental
institution.55
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE APPEALABILITY OF PRETRIAL
COMMITMENT ORDERS
A. Appealability of Pretrial Commitment Orders Under the Original
Statutory Framework
Congress adopted the original version of the Insanity Defense Reform
Act in 194956 after lengthy debate and investigation by the Judicial Con-
includes protection of defendant from being put to trial twice for the same offense); Stack
v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (immediate appeal of denial of
bail reduction motion is necessary because "unless it can be reviewed before sentence, it
never can be reviewed at all"); see also United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860
(1978) ("[E]ach [case] involved an asserted right the legal and practical value of which
would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.").
51. Immediate appeals have been taken from: orders denying a motion to return
property seized pursuant to search warrant, see Angel-Torres v. United States, 712 F.2d
717, 719 (1st Cir. 1983); Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15,
16 (7th Cir. 1978), orders denying a motion to quash indictment of judge on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, see United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 708-09 (11 th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983), orders denying a motion to dismiss on grounds of
selective prosecution, see United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1981).
Additionally, the government has a statutory right to immediately appeal the granting of
pretrial suppression motions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 708 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1981)
(quoting United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also United
States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 266 (1982) (Supreme Court cases
allowing immediate appeal all involved a right that "'would be destroyed if it were not
vindicated before trial'" (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860
(1978))).
53. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960); United States v. Ives,
574 F.2d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980); United States v.
Pogany, 465 F.2d 72, 79 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968, 970 (9th
Cir. 1971); cf United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 268 (1982)
(reversal of conviction and provision of new trial free of prejudicial error are generally
adequate means of vindicating rights of accused).
54. See infra notes 126-47 and accompanying text.
55. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1986).
56. Act of Sept. 7, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-285, 63 Stat. 686 (current version at 18
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ference1 7 Congress expressly provided for a two step procedure for pre-
trial competency determinations. First, the Act of 1949 provided that if
a court had reason to believe that the defendant was incompetent, it
could order a psychiatric examination.58 Upon a psychiatrist's recom-
mendation that defendant was incompetent, the court ordered an adver-
sarial hearing to determine the defendant's competency. 59 Second, a
finding of incompetency warranted committing the defendant to the cus-
tody of the Attorney General until either the defendant attained compe-
tency or the pending proceedings were disposed of according to law.' If
the hearing indicated that the defendant was both incompetent and dan-
gerous he was committed indefinitely.6 Thus, by its express terms, the
statute confined the incompetent defendant for an indefinte duration
without any means for reevaluating his competency.
62
The first cases to address the issue of immediate appealability63 com-
pensated for the statute's shortcomings" by allowing the defendant to
U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (Supp. III 1985)). The Act of 1949 expanded the then existing stat-
ute governing mental defectives that only dealt with mentally defective convicts, see Act
of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-121, 62 Stat. 855 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-
4247 (Supp. III 1985)), by adding sections governing pre-conviction incompetency and
insanity. For the purposes of this Note, therefore, the 1949 enactment will be treated as
the original version of the Act.
57. See H.R. Rep. No. 1319, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1928, 1928.
58. Section 4244 of the Act provided that at any time "after arrest and prior to the
imposition of sentence," upon motion or sua sponte, the court shall order a psychiatric
examination to determine if the defendant is "unable to understand the proceedings
against him or properly to assist in his own defense." Act of Sept. 7, 1949, ch. 535,
§ 4244, 63 Stat. 686, 686 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)-(c) (Supp. III 1985)).
The court may order the defendant committed for purposes of the examination. See id.
59. See Act of Sept. 7, 1949, ch. 535, § 4244, 63 Stat. 686, 686 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 4241(a) (Supp. III 1985)). Following a finding of incompetency, "the court
shall hold a hearing, upon due notice, at which evidence as to the mental conditon of the
accused may be submitted, including that of the reporting psychiatrist, and make a find-
ing with respect thereto." Id
60. See Act of Sept. 7, 1949, ch. 535, § 4246, 63 Stat. 686, 687 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 4241(d) (Supp. III 1985)). The statute and the legislative history do not define
precisely the phrase "disposed of according to law." The New York statute, the func-
tional equivalent of the federal statute, is instructive. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 730.60(5) (McKinney 1984). The New York statute provides that the charges may be
dismissed upon a defendant's failure to attain competency and the defendant may, in lieu,
be civilly committed. See id
61. See Act of Sept. 7, 1949, ch. 535, §§ 4247, 4248, 63 Stat. 686, 687-88 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (Supp. III 1985)). A third prerequisite to § 4247 commit-
ment was that no other suitable arrangements could be made. Commitment continued
until one of these three conditions no longer existed. See id. at § 4248.
62. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732-33 (1972) (straightforward application
of §§ 4244 and 4246 would result in indefinite commitment).
63. See United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372, 1374 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Klein, 325 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1963); Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650, 652 (9th
Cir.), cert dismissed, 346 U.S. 870 (1953); see also infra note 68 (cases where appeal taken
without discussing jurisdiction).
64. "Because it has not generally been recognized that a finding of incompetency,
which may be made over the defendant's objection, often leads to a deprivation of liberty
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appeal immediately the pretrial commitment order.65 By invoking the
collateral order doctrine, courts found the defendant "plainly entitled" to
an immediate appeal." This view gained uniform acceptance. Courts
adopted this approach either summarily67 or implicitly by simply enter-
taining the appeal.68 Immediate appeal of pretrial commitment orders
thus was consistently permitted at the earliest stage in the proceeding at
which they were contested.
In 1956 the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret the
Act of 1949. In Greenwood v. United States,69 the Court explained that
the correct procedure under the statute was to order a special dangerous-
ness hearing following a determination that the incompetency was more
than temporary so that only dangerous incompetents would be commit-
ted indefinitely.7" Courts construed Greenwood as imposing a limitation
of reasonableness on the duration that a defendant could remain commit-
ted prior to trial.7" It was not until 1984 in United States v. Cheama,2
however, that the procedure under the statute, as judicially construed,
was fully delineated.
Prior to Cheama courts consistently had allowed appeal at the earliest
possible stage in the commitment proceedings.73 In Cheama, however,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted a novel approach.
The court analyzed the statutory framework as a three stage process.74
The analysis in fact was similar to the procedure of the current statute.75
as severe as a prison sentence, safeguards comparable to those surrounding criminal con-
viction are lacking." Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 454
(1967) [hereinafter Incompetency].
65. See United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372, 1374 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Klein, 325 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1963); Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650, 652 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 870 (1953).
66. See United States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1963); see also United
States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372, 1374 (4th Cir. 1969) (citing Klein with approval).
67. See United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372, 1374 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Klein, 325 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1963); Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650, 652 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 870 (1953).
68. See, e.g., United States v. DeBellis, 649 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v.
Collins, 525 F.2d 213 (Ist Cir. 1975); United States v. Wood, 469 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966).
69. 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
70. See id. at 374. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal courts' power
under the Act to commit a defendant for more than a temporary duration. See id. at 375.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372, 1374 (4th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705, 708-09 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F.
Supp. 822, 824 (W.D. Mo. 1970); United States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4, 6 (N.D. Cal.
1969); Maurietta v. Ciccone, 305 F. Supp. 775, 780 (W.D. Mo. 1969); see also Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732-33 (1972) (recognizing that since Greenwood all courts have
construed the statute as containing rule of reasonableness and holding that this limit is
constitutionally required).
72. 730 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1984).
73. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
74. See United States v. Cheama, 730 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1984).
75. For a discussion of the current statutory framework, see infra notes 90-96 and
accompanying text.
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Under Cheama a court first must inquire into the competency of the de-
fendant by ordering a psychiatric examination and holding a hearing.76
Second, upon a finding of incompetency, the court may commit the de-
fendant for a reasonable time to determine if he will regain competency
in the near future." Third, at the end of the initial confinement, another
hearing is held to determine if and when the defendant will attain compe-
tency.78 Upon a finding of long-term or indefinite incompetency, the
court may order further confinement only upon a finding of
dangerousness.79
The defendant in Cheama was denied appeal at the second stage, that
is, when he was initially committed for six months to determine if he
would become competent.80 The court held that appeal was proper only
when the last stage in the proceedings results in a finding of indefinite
incompetency.81 In the court's view, only then did the pretrial commit-
ment order satisfy the collateral order doctrine and rise to the level of
finality required by section 1291.82
B. Appealability of Pretrial Commitment Orders Under the Current
Statutory Framework
The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,83 an amended version of
the Act of 1949,84 clarified the predecessor statute and codified its judi-
cial gloss.85 For the most part, amendments were made to the structure
of the Act.86 There were only a few significant changes to its practical
76. See United States v. Cheama, 730 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1984).
77. See id; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972) (constitution re-
quires that length of confinement be limited to reasonable period of time).
78. Neither the original Act nor the Cheama analysis expressly require this second
hearing. The Cheama court, however, recognized that a "court [must] follow the statu-
tory guidelines and conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant is permanently
incompetent." United States v. Cheama, 730 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1984). Thus, it
reasonably may be inferred that, to reach the third stage-a finding of permanent incom-
petency-a hearing must be held between the second and third stages. See id; supra notes
58-59 and accompanying text.
79. See United States v. Cheama, 730 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1984).
80. See id
81. See id
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); supra note 17.
83. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (Supp. III
1985)).
84. Act of Sept. 7, 1949, Pub. L. No. 285, 63 Stat. 686 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4241-4247 (Supp. III 1985)).
85. For example, the amended statute adopts the test of competency set out in Dusky
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960), and the durational limit of reasonableness
recognized by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972). See S.
Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3182, 3418.
86. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3182, 3414 ("Section 4241 follows present federal law .... ). Section 4241
tracks, with some modifications, original sections 4244, 4245 and 4246. See id. at 3415.
This Note focuses on only those sections of the amended Act that are relevant to pretrial
commitment orders. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4247 (Supp. III 1985).
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application.7 Among these changes is the apparent adoption of a three
stage approach similar to that delineated in Cheama."8
The procedure under the amended Act commences if there is reason-
able cause 9 to believe that the defendant is incompetent, in which case a
hearing is ordered.90 Second, if the court finds the defendant incompe-
tent, it may commit him for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed
four months, to determine whether there is substantial probability that
he will attain competency in the foreseeable future.91 The implied limit
of reasonableness in the original version of the Act is thereby expressly
incorporated and limited to an initial period of four months.92 Following
initial confinement, the defendant may be recommitted for an additional
reasonable period of time until he attains competency or the pending
charges are disposed of according to law.9 3 This provision tracks the
original statute,94 making express the previously implicit limit of reason-
ableness. 95 Third, if any hearing subsequent to the first hearing results in
a finding that there is no substantial probability of the defendant attain-
ing competency, he can be committed indefinitely only upon a finding of
dangerousness and a lack of suitable state arrangements for his cus-
tody.96 Thus, Cheama's interpretation of the Act of 1949 is directly con-
gruent with the express terms of the Act as amended.97
Recently, in United States v. Gold,98 the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
87. The current version of § 4241 does not require that a motion for a hearing present
the grounds for the belief that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. This provision,
however, now is incorporated into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See S. Rep.
No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3182, 3415-16; Fed. R. Crim. P. 47. Section 4241 gives the court discretion to order a
hearing prior to a psychiatric examination, contrary to prior law that required an evalua-
tion to precede the hearing. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3416-17.
88. Although Congress did not expressly adopt the Cheama approach as such, a com-
parison of the procedure under the amended statute and the Cheama approach reveals
their congruence. Compare supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text with infra notes 90-
95 and accompanying text. Recently, in United States v. Ohnick, 803 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.
1986), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized the congruence of
the three stage procedure of Cheama with that of the current statutory framework by
using the Cheama approach in its application of the current statute. See id. at 1486.
89. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)-(c) (Supp. III 1985). At the hearing, the defendant is
represented by counsel and has an opportunity to testify, present evidence, subpoena wit-
nesses, and confront and cross examine witnesses. See id. at § 4247(d).
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
92. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3182, 3418; supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
94. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3182, 3414.
95. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (Supp. III 1985); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3418.
97. See supra note 88.
98. 790 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1986).
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ond Circuit recognized the need for the immediate appeal of a pretrial
commitment order under the amended Act. Through careful application
of the collateral order doctrine, the court held that even if the finding of
incompetency results in only a four month commitment, immediate ap-
peal is both appropriate and imperative.9 9 First, the issue of incompe-
tency is "entirely separate"" °° from the issue of guilt or innocence.
Moreover, the order is effectively unreviewable on post-conviction ap-
peal.101 Finally, confinement for at least four months conclusively denies
liberty prior to trial for that period of time.'0 2 Thus, immediate appeal of
the initial commitment order was held proper. 0 3
The Gold court, recognizing that the Cheama court's approach under
the original statute was much like the current statutory framework,1
4
refused to adopt the Cheama holding that the third stage, commitment
for an indefinite period, must occur before appeal is proper.0" The Sec-
ond Circuit's express rejection 06 of the Cheama holding and the statute's
failure to address the issue, leave open the question of when appeal of
pretrial commitment orders is proper.
III. IMMEDIATE APPEAL OF PRETRIAL COMMITMENT ORDERS
Immediate appeal of pretrial commitment orders should be permitted
before a defendant is confined for any period of time. No other view
comports with the collateral order doctrine, the policies underlying the
finality requirement of appellate review and the purposes of the Insanity
Defense Reform Act.
99. See ia at 239.
100. See id. at 238.
101. See id at 239.
102. See id; cf United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1986) (to
avoid "serious constitutional" questions concerning the length of defendant's detention
without bail, court ordered the defendant, who had been detained for four months, imme-
diately released or tried within thirty days). The Gold court recognized the importance of
immediate appeal of pretrial commitment orders because of their frustration of a liberty
interest. "If a defendant is not incompetent, he should not be confined in a psychiatric
care facility." United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1986); cf. United States
ex re! Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1078 (2d Cir.) (recognizing the "terrifying
possibility" that a prisoner transferred to a mental institution "may not be mentally ill at
all"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969).
103." See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1986).
104. Although the Gold court did not expressly recognize the similarities, it did so
implicitly by referring to the three stage approach delineated in Cheama and holding,
under the current statutory framework, that appeal is proper at the second stage. See id.;
see also United States v. Ohnick, 803 F.2d 1485, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986) (following
Cheama's three step approach under the current statutory framework).
105. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1986).
106. See id ("We disagree with the view that matters must proceed through the third
step, Le., that of ordering the defendant's long-term commitment, before the defendant is
allowed to appeal.").
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A. The Collateral Order Doctrine
The three requisites of the collateral order doctrine, conclusiveness,
collateralness and unreviewability on direct appeal, plainly are met by a
pretrial commitment order.
1. Conclusiveness
The pretrial commitment order, whether it be for a "reasonable" pe-
riod of time or four months, is conclusive as to that period of time.
0 7
The trial court's determination for that period is not reviewable prior to
its expiration. 108 There are no "further steps" that the defendant can
take in the trial court to avoid the four month period of confinement. 0 9
It is not enough to say, as did the Cheama court, that upon a finding of
indefinite incompetency, the commitment order ultimately may be ap-
pealed." 0 Not all competency determinations proceed to a finding of
107. See id.
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985). The statute does not provide the
defendant with any means to object to the initial commitment order. During the confine-
ment, if the director of the facility believes the defendant has attained competency he
must file a certificate with the court so stating. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e) (Supp. III 1985).
The court must then hold a hearing to determine the defendant's competency. See id.
This procedure, however, does not give the defendant any independent power to chal-
lenge the initial commitment. See Incompetency, supra note 64, at 471-72. Moreover, the
provision for discharge set forth in § 4247 cannot affect the initial four month confine-
ment because motions for discharge under that section can be brought only after six
months. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) (Supp. III 1985). Similarly, habeas corpus relief is
inadequate because the petition must be filed in the same district court in which the
defendant was originally found incompetent. See Glenn v. Ciccone, 370 F.2d 361, 363
(8th Cir. 1966). Even if the petition is heard by a different judge, habeas corpus is inad-
visable because it would have the effect of pitting one district judge against another on the
issue of incompetency. See id.
109. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
110. See United States v. Cheama, 730 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1984). The court
recognized that appeal of commitment orders is proper, but only after a finding of indefi-
nite incompetency. See id. Paradoxically, the court referred to earlier cases that allowed
immediate appeal of the initial commitment orders. Yet, contrary to its own assertion
that there is no need to depart from precedent, the court pushed the point of appealability
back from a preliminary commitment order to the final one. Compare Higgins v. United
States, 205 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir.) (appeal taken when a second hearing following the
initial inquiry into competency but prior to a finding of indefinite incompetency, the sec-
ond Cheama stage, resulted in order commiting defendant), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 870
(1953) with United States v. Cheama, 730 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1984) (appeal de-
nied at second stage of proceedings).
The Cheama court recognized that "[t]he statutory scheme from which orders derive
allows the confinement of defendants for extended periods of time, even though they have
not been tried or convicted of the offense charged." Cheama, 730 F.2d at 1385. The
court failed to heed its own concern, however, by denying the defendant's appeal of an
order committing him for six months. See id. at 1386. This resulted in the defendant
being confined for a total of sixteen months before being found indefinitely incompetent
and given leave to appeal. See United States v. Cheama, 783 F.2d 165, 168 (10th Cir.
1986). Compounding the "serious deprivation of Cheama's liberty," the appellate court
even then refused to decide the validity of his continued confinement and remanded the
case to the trial court for further development of the record. See id.
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indefinite incompetency."' Under Cheama, if following the initial four
month commitment the defendant is found competent, the third stage,
indefinite incompetency, is never reached and the defendant has endured
one period of unreviewed confinement." 2 Similarly, if it is determined
that competency soon will be attained, the third stage is avoided and the
defendant will have to endure a second period of unreviewed confine-
ment." '3 Both determinations, however, conclude the proceedings as to
their respective periods of confinement.' "'
2. Collateralness
The pretrial commitment order, irrespective of its duration, is collat-
eral to the issue of innocence or guilt." 5 Unlike insanity, competency by
its nature is a collateral order. Although both competency determina-
tions and insanity pleas require the court to discern the defendant's
mental state, they address distinct issues." 6 The insanity defense con-
cerns the defendant's mental state at the time of the alleged crime and his
criminal responsibility for the offense." 7 The purpose of an incompe-
tency hearing, on the other hand, is to determine the defendant's mental
health at the time of the proceedings against him." 8
A more accurate analogy is between the pretrial commitment order
111. The statutory framework provides for the resumption of the trial proceeding if,
prior to a finding of indefinite incompetency but following confinement of four months,
and possibly an additonal reasonable period, the defendant regains competency. See 18
U.S.C. § 4241(d)-(e) (Supp. 111 1985).
112. See id at § 4241(d)(1).
113. See id at § 4241(d)(2). Only when the confinement for an additional reasonable
period does not result in the defendant attaining competency is there a third stage danger-
ousness hearing. See id- at §§ 4241(d)(2), 4246.
114. See supra note 108.
115. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Cheama, 730 F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th Cir. 1984).
116. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1986); Lasky, supra note 1,
at 12; Commission Primer, supra note 1, at 21. Congress recognized the independence of
insanity and incompetency by providing for their separation in certain instances. See 18
U.S.C. § 4241(f) (Supp. III 1985) ("A finding by the court that the defendant is mentally
competent to stand trial shall not prejudice the defendant in raising the issue of his in-
sanity as a defense to the offense charged, and shall not be admissible as evidence in a trial
for the offense charged.").
117. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 637 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir. 1980); Reese v. Wain-
wright, 600 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979); United States v.
Pilkington, 583 F.2d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 948 (1979); see also
Commission Primer, supra note 1, at 12 (1984) ("The insanity defense... [is] advanced
to prove that at the time of the alleged offense the person could not be held responsible
for the acts alleged."); Incompetency, supra note 64, at 454 ("[Tihe defense of insanity...
[raises] the question.., whether the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
criminal act was such that he should not be held responsible for his conduct.").
118. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (setting out the
common law test of incompetency as whether the defendant is able to consult with his
lawyer and whether he has a factual understanding of the proceedings against him); 18
U.S.C. § 4241(a) (Supp. III 1985) (court must determine whether the defendant "is un-
able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to
assist properly in his defense").
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and a pretrial bail order. 1 9 The pretrial bail order often represents a
compromise between the defendant's right to be free prior to convic-
tion '2 and the public's interest in ensuring the defendant's presence at
trial. '2 The pretrial commitment order represents a similar compro-
mise. The defendant's right to be free prior to conviction is balanced
against the public's interest in ensuring his effective presence at trial.122
119. The pretrial bail order compels the criminal defendant to deposit with the court
some form of security to ensure his presence at trial. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5
(1951); United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1978) (purpose of bail bond is
to secure the presence of the defendant, not to punish); Heikkinen v. United States, 208
F.2d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 1953) (purpose of bail is to secure defendant's presence at trial);
Note, Release Pending Appeal A Narrow Definition of "Substantial Question" Under the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 1081, 1083 (1986) [hereinafter Release
Pending Appeal. The 1984 amendments to the Bail Reform Act expanded the scope of
bail decisions from merely securing the defendant's presence at trial to also providing
protection from dangerous defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985); United
States v. Coleman, 777 F.2d 888, 894 (3d Cir. 1985).
120. The right to pretrial liberty arises from a logical reading of the eighth amendment
to the Constitution and is inherent in the liberty concept of due process. See Meechaicum
v. Fountain, 696 F.2d 790, 791-92 (10th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Melendez-
Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 998 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[P]hysical confinement of an individual is the
ultimate deprivation of liberty."). The Supreme Court recognized the importance of the
"traditional right" to be free prior to conviction, explaining that "[u]nless this right ... is
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would
lose its meaning." Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); see United States v. Barber, 140
U.S. 164, 167 (1891) ("[piresumptively they are innocent of the crime charged, and enti-
tled to their constitutional privilege of being admitted to bail"). Explaining the basis of
the bail statutes, the Court wrote that they "have been framed upon the theory that a
person accused of a crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the court
of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment or punishment." Hud-
son v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895); see Heikkinen v. United States, 208 F.2d 738,
740 (7th Cir. 1953) ("Since appellant has not yet been brought to trial he has an absolute
right to be admitted to bail. .. ").
121. The Supreme Court has long recognized this conflict. See Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused's
giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found
guilty."); United States v. Barber, 140 U.S. 164, 167 (1891) ("[I]n criminal cases it is for
the interest of the public as well as the accused that the latter should not be detained in
custody prior to his trial, if the government can be assured of his presence at that time
*.. ."). "'[B]y conditioning release on the offer of financial security, [bail] seeks to
reconcile the defendant's interest in, and society's commitment to, pretrial liberty with
the need to assure the defendant's presence at trial.'" Meechaicum v. Fountain, 696 F.2d
790, 791 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1981)); see
also Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 Alb. L. Rev. 33, 101 (1977) (to
reconcile the competing interests the motion of bail is employed); Release Pending Ap-
peal, supra note 119, at 1083 ("The bail bond system ... was intended as one compromise
of [the defendant's and society's] conflicting interest.").
122. The standard used to determine competency reflects this compromise in that only
defendants who cannot understand the proceedings or aid in the preparation of their
defense are found incompetent. See supra note 118. The Supreme Court has recognized
that prosecution of a defendant who cannot participate effectively in the proceedings has
been construed as being essentially a trial in absentia. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 171 (1975); cf United States ex rel. Phillips v. Lane, 580 F. Supp. 839, 843 (N.D. I11.
1984) (analogizing to pretrial competency proceedings, the court found that "if a suppres-
sion hearing [is] of the type... at which petitioner had a right to be present, it was also a
proceeding that could not go forward if he was shown to be unable to cooperate with his
[Vol. 55
PRETRIAL COMMITMENT ORDERS
In the context of a pretrial commitment order, however, the "presence"
at trial is mental presence rather than physical presence. The incompe-
tent defendant cannot be effectively present at trial because he cannot aid
in his defense or understand the proceedings.'23 Both the Supreme
Court12 4 and Congress 2 5 recognize the right to immediate appeal of bail
orders. The similarity between bail orders and pretrial commitment or-
ders calls for their similar treatment as immediately appealable collateral
orders.
3. Unreviewability
The Supreme Court has held that certain rights, such as the right to be
free from double jeopardy, necessarily embody the right to be exempt
from the trial proceeding, making post-trial review impossible. 26 Simi-
larly, the right to freedom prior to conviction'27 necessarily includes the
right to avoid pretrial commitment.' 28 A post-conviction review cannot
protect this liberty interest because the defendant already vill have been
subject to the confinement.' 29 The most obvious case of the un-
attorney or understand the nature of the proceeding"), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 249 (1986).
The effective absence of the incompetent defendant led the Supreme Court to rule that
trial of an incompetent is a due process violation. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,
385 (1966); supra note 9.
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (Supp. III 1985). The accuracy of the trial is furthered
by the defendant's ability to communicate to his attorney all facts of which he is aware.
See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); United States v. Mercado, 469 F.2d
1148, 1152 (2d Cir. 1972); United States ex reL Roberts v. Yeager, 402 F.2d 918, 919 (3d
Cir. 1968); United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 858, 859 (N.D. Cal 1975); United States
v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972, 974 (,V.D. Mo. 1964); see also supra note 10 (discussing
requisites of competency).
124. See Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
125. The Bail Reform Act, originally passed in 1966, provides for prompt appellate
review of bail decisions. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976,
1982 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (Supp. III 1985)).
126. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 (1979) (to avoid exposure to questions
for acts in Congress and thereby enjoy full protection of the speech and debate clause,
congressmen must be able to immediately appeal denial of motion to dismiss on such
grounds); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) ("[Tlhe guarantee against
double jeopardy assures an individual that.., he will not be forced ... to endure the
personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than once for
the same offense.").
127. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128. To avoid exposure to double jeopardy, the accused cannot be forced to "run the
gauntlet" of a second trial before review of his double jeopardy claim. See Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977). Similarly, to avoid frustration of the accused's
right to freedom prior to conviction, he must not be made to endure a pretrial commit-
ment without immediate review. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir.
1986) ("[T]he liberty interest of the committed defendant is one as to which the '[r]elief
... must be speedy if it is to be effective.'" (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)));
United States v. Cheama, 730 F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th Cir. 1984) ("To hold that committed
[defendants] must wait until the substantive charges are finally disposed of would mean
that there would be no meaningful review of the relevant hearings and determinations.").
129. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Cheama, 730 F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th Cir. 1984); cf Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169,
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reviewability of the commitment order occurs when the defendant is sub-
sequently not convicted. If the charges are disposed of according to law
or there is an acquittal, there will be no review of the pretrial commit-
ment order because the defendant will not, and the prosecution may
not, 130 appeal a final judgment in the defendant's favor.' 3 '
An order denying the right to be free prior to trial, as manifested in the
bail laws, is immediately appealable. 32 Unless such orders are reviewed
immediately they "never can be reviewed at all."' 3 3 The bail provisions
allow the defendant to stay out of jail until a trial renders him guilty and
he has exhausted his judicial appeals.134 Denying bail135 or setting bail at
an excessive amount 136 results in incarceration of the defendant without
a conviction. Further, the defendant's ability to consult with counsel and
to prepare his defense is impaired.' 37 A procedure for immediate recon-
sideration, therefore, is a "practical necessity."' 138 The pretrial commit-
ment order is directly analogous.
A pretrial commitment order frustrates a defendant's right to be free
173 (1963) (post-conviction diagnostic commitment "might raise constitutional problems
of significant proportions" if not immediately appealable).
130. See generally United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-53 (1975) (full discussion
of historical and current interperations of double jeopardy prohibition).
131. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1986).
132. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951).
133. Id. at 12 (Jackson, J., concurring).
134. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3141 (Supp. III 1985)); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he spirit of the [bail] procedure is to enable [defendants] to stay out of
jail until a trial has found them guilty."); Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895)
("[A] person accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the
court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment or punishment.").
135. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3141 (Supp. III 1985)).
136. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (excessive bail is repugnant to the Consti-
tution and the statutory standards).
137. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Duke, Bail
Reform for the Eighties: A Reply to Senator Kennedy, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 40, 67 (1980)
("Pretrial incarceration . . . heavily burdens the defendant in both his ability and his
willingness to contest the charges .... He completely lacks control over the amount of
time and attention paid to the preparation of his defense."); Thaler, Punishing the Inno-
cent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978
Wis. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1978) ("[M]ost importantly, the mere fact of detention severely
restricts the extent to which the detainee can participate in his own defense."); cf Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) (most important interest that the speedy trial right
protects is to limit the impairment of the defense caused by delay because such impair-
ment "skews the fairness of the entire system"); Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 69 (3d
Cir. 1981) ("[A]dmission to bail enhances the adversary system by permitting an untram-
meled preparation of the defense."); Duker, supra note 121, at 68 (the taking of bail
"theoretically permits the accused to aid his counsel in the preparation of a defense").
138. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 11 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jack-
son recognized that although the discretionary nature of the bail order is such that it
rarely will be disturbed on appeal, some form of immediate review is nevertheless neces-
sary. See id. at 11-12. This conclusion recognizes that if the bail order is not reviewed
immediately there can be no review at all. See id. at 12; United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d
235, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1986).
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prior to conviction. 13 9 The defendant's ability to prepare his defense is
impaired"4 and he is confined without first being convicted.' 4 ' Immedi-
ate appeal of pretrial commitment orders, therefore, is a similar "practi-
cal necessity" to ensure their effective review.142 Like an erroneous bail
determination, the erroneous commitment order is not one that impli-
cates the validity of the trial proceedings or the criminal charges;' 43 the
remedy of a new trial cannot rectify the defendant's interim loss of
liberty. 44
That the initial commitment order is for a maximum of four months'
4 5
rather than, as Cheama requires, an indefinite duration, a6 does not
lessen the need for its immediate review. The appellate court in a post-
conviction review is no more able to restore to the defendant the four
months unnecessarily spent in an institution than it is able to restore any
longer period of time. 147 In sum, any order of confinement prior to trial
pursuant to a finding of incompetency is, by its own terms irremediable
after its execution.
B. The Policies Underlying the Finality Requirement of Section 1291
Finality as a prerequisite to appeal is based on general notions of effi-
cient administration of justice. 48 Review of pretrial orders in criminal
cases usually is postponed until after conviction and sentencing to avoid
unnecessary delay in the pending proceedings.' 49  The importance of
avoiding delay in criminal cases is manifest in the sixth amendment right
139. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1986); supra note 120
and accompanying text.
140. Pretrial confinement can have a detrimental impact on the accused by causing
him to lose his job, disrupting his family life, hindering his ability to gather evidence,
contact witnesses and otherwise prepare his defense. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
532-33 (1972); supra note 137.
141. Due process requires suspension of the proceedings until the defendant attains
competency. See supra note 9.
142. Pretrial commitment orders, like pretrial bail decisions, cannot be reviewed effec-
tively after conviction. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text. Thus, although
pretrial commitment orders are set aside only if they are clearly arbitrary, see infra note
167, like bail decisions, their immediate review is necessary. See supra notes 133-38 and
accompanying text; cf United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 857 n.6 (1978) (" 'Ap-
peal rights cannot depend on the facts of a particular case."' (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 354 U.S. 394, 405 (1957))). Both bail and pretrial competency proceedings seek to
protect the same interests, see supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text, and may result
in undue hardship on the defense, see supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
143. Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (pretrial
bail order) with United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1986) (pretrial commit-
ment order).
144. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1986); supra notes 35 & 41
and accompanying text.
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
146. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
147. See United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1986).
148. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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to speedy trial 5° and the emphasis in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure on the swift resolution of criminal cases.' 5' When an order is
amenable to effective post-conviction review, the benefits to the defend-
ant of immediate appeal are outweighed by the costs of delay to the
system. '52
In the case of a pretrial commitment order, there can be no effective
post-conviction review 53 and the cost and delay caused by the confine-
ment' -54 actually can be avoided by reversal of erroneous findings on im-
mediate appeal. Indeed, concern over delay caused by commitment
prompted the earliest holdings of immediate appealability of pretrial
commitment orders. 55 Some state courts have taken advantage of the
opportunity to avoid delay by granting an immediate appeal when the
defendant contests a finding of incompetency, but not when he has been
adjudged competent.156 These state courts have thus minimized both de-
lay of trial and piecemeal appellate litigation of pretrial commitment
orders.
Other policy considerations underlying the finality requirement in-
clude deference to the trial court judge and avoiding the frustration and
cost of piecemeal appellate litigation. 5 7 Deference is embodied in the
standard of review on appeal' 8 and the choice of an appellate remedy
150. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982).
151. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 2 (purpose of the rules is to eliminate "unjustifiable expense
and delay"), 50 (preference to be given to criminal proceedings on district court
calendars).
152. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 126-47 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
155. See United States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1963); Higgins v. United
States, 205 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 870 (1953). The concern for
promptness in criminal cases "has become increasingly important as crime has increased,
court dockets have swelled, and detention facilities have become overcrowded." Flanagan
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984).
156. See, e.g., People v. Fields, 62 Cal.2d 538, 540-42, 42 Cal. Rptr. 833, 834-35, 399
P.2d 369, 370-71, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 858 (1965); Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353, 357 &
n.3, 384 A.2d 91, 94 & n.3 (1978); State v. Guatney, 207 Neb. 501, 507-08, 299 N.W.2d
538, 543 (1980); see also State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1980) (temporary civil
commitment order pursuant to state statute can be challenged on appeal despite usual
mooting effect of release because of the importance of providing opportunity for the indi-
viduals to challenge any unfair institutionalization); Casenote, State v. Lodge: The Moot-
ness Doctrine as it Applies to an Appeal from Involuntary Commitment for Temporary
Hospitalization in a Mental Hospital, 22 S. Tex. L.J. 155 (1981).
157. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1984); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 325-26 (1940).
158. The pretrial commitment orders are not set aside unless clearly arbitrary. See
United States v. Barker, No. 86-5455, slip op. at 8 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1986); United States
v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v.
Aponte, 591 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Fratus, 530 F.2d 644, 647
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976); In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916, 918 (1st Cir.
1970).
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that ranges from rehearing to reversal.1 59 The concern of avoiding piece-
meal appellate litigation is embodied in the requirements of the collateral
order doctrine."6 Harrassing appeals generally are remedied by sanc-
tions or awarding costs and attorney's fees.16 Thus, immediate appeal of
the pretrial commitment order, which satisfies the collateral order doc-
trine, does not frustrate these concerns.
C. The Purposes of the Insanity Defense Reform Act
The Act originally was adopted out of concern for the large number of
incompetents convicted without the capacity to aid in their own de-
fense. 162 The Act seeks to protect the defendant with less than full
mental capacity from trial and possible conviction. 163 With the passage
of the 1984 amendments, 64 Congress reiterated that the purposes of the
Act are to avoid the fundamental unfairness of convicting an incompe-
tent defendant and to protect the integrity of the judicial process by en-
suring the highest level of accuracy and defendant participation. 65
The extensive procedures the Act employs to determine and treat in-
competency underscore the concern for fairness to the defendant.116 Im-
mediate appeal is consistent with this concern. Fairness to the defendant
is furthered by allowing the appellate court immediately to provide the
defendant with a second opinion of the legal sufficiency of the evidence
regarding his competency. 167
The effect of a pretrial commitment order is to suspend the proceed-
159. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1982).
160. The collateral order doctrine is a narrow departure from the final judgment rule
that arises out of a practical reading of finality. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying
text.
161. See eg., Boomer v. United States, 755 F.2d 696, 697 (8th Cir. 1985); Moulton v.
Commissioner, 733 F.2d 734, 735 (10th Cir.) modified, 744 F.2d 1448 (1984); DeWitt v.
Western Pac. R.R, 719 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982); Fed.
R. App. P. 38.
162. See H.R. Rep. No. 1319, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.
Code Cong. Serv. 1928, 1928; 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d
§ 196, at 719-20 (1982) ("The statute was a recognition of the inadequacy of prior proce-
dures for sifting out mental cases prior to trial and conviction .... ); see also United
States v. Dunn, 594 F.2d 1367, 1372 (10th Cir. 1979) ("The purpose of [incompetency]
proceeding is to advise the trial court as to competency [of the] defendant .... "), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 852 (1979).
163. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
164. See Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (Supp. III 1985)).
165. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3182, 3414. A competent defendant advances the accuracy of the trial.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
166. The Act delineates extensive procedures to provide the defendant with the treat-
ment necessary to restore his competence. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text;
see also United States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Congress underscored
the significance of mental competency as a prerequisite to a fair and humane criminal
trial by its enactment of [the original version of the Insanity Defense Reform Act].").
167. Cf supra note 158 (standard of review on appeal).
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ings until the defendant attains competency. 68 By delaying the trial,
memories may fade and documents and witnesses may disappear. 169 The
cost of institutionalizing the defendant and providing him with effective
treatment is great. 170 These burdens, however, justifiably are borne by
the system to further the purposes of the Act. Immediate appeal mini-
mizes the delay and costs by weeding out erroneous findings of
incompetency.
Immediate appeal also guards against abuse of the Act. Commenta-
tors warn that competency proceedings often are instituted in an attempt
to thwart the opponent's case or to secure a delay in the trial.17 1 Imme-
diate appeal counters these abusive tactics by catching erroneous findings
before they can have their intended effect.
In sum, immediate appeal of pretrial commitment orders effectively
ensures that the statutory shield of the Act is not turned into a sword
against the defendant nor the government.
CONCLUSION
The necessity and propriety of immediate appeal of pretrial commit-
ment orders is compelling. Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, the
orders are final trial court orders from which there is a statutory right to
immediate review. The orders conclusively determine the defendant's
right to be free prior to trial. Post-conviction review of the orders is
meaningless. Nothing that can be done after trial can recompense the
defendant for the time spent confined in a mental institution. Weeding
out erroneous incompetency determinations as soon as possible furthers
the policy of the finality rule to avoid unnecessary delay. The protection
provided to incompetents by the Insanity Defense Reform Act from be-
ing tried effectively in absentia is unnecessary where the incompetency
finding is erroneous. Indeed, commitment may frustrate accuracy by the
effect of delay on memories and availability of documents and witnesses.
The integrity of the court is preserved by providing the means immedi-
ately to contest a finding of incompetency, thereby protecting the system
from unnecessary cost and delay.
Helene R. Banks
168. See supra notes 9, 163 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
171. See ABA Standards, supra note 6, at 7-142 to 7-143; A. Matthews, supra note 1,
at 92-100; Schulman, supra note 5, at 154-56; Bennet, supra note 10, at 382-83; Winick,
supra note 8, at 933.
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